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Abstract

Wastewater surveillance has been used for a variety of purposes but, in recent years, has most
notably been utilized during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many universities in the United States
used it as a means of monitoring levels of the SARS-CoV-2 virus on their campuses. The
University of South Carolina, University of Arizona, and University of North Carolina- Charlotte
were three such schools. An analysis of data published by these three schools has been used to
synthesize a proposed list of best methods to be used by other universities during the
reemergence of SARS-CoV-2 or during the outbreak of a new pathogen. Additionally, factors
such as supply chain issues and burnout have been evaluated to determine their effects on
laboratory efficiency and the sustainability research projects in the midst of a pandemic.
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Wastewater Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 on American University Campuses: A
Comparison of Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Introduction
What influences researchers to brave the unpleasantness of the sewer system to collect
samples of raw wastewater? The answer is simple: the desire to improve the public’s health.
Wastewater, defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as “water from
household/building use (i.e., toilets, showers, sinks) that contain human fecal waste, as well as
water from non-household sources (e.g., rainwater and industrial use),” is an invaluable public
health tool (CDC, 2021c). Municipal sewage collection systems handle almost 80 percent of all
households in the United States, anonymously summarizing the health of citizens (CDC, 2021c).
The collection and processing of raw sewage, analyzed in a laboratory, is used to quantify the
viral load or amount of other infectious agents present in the population represented by the
sample (Ahmed, 2020a). This form of environmental epidemiology has been deemed wastewater
surveillance (Gosnell, 2021).
Wastewater surveillance is a population-level tactic, meaning that it can provide
information on the prevalence of an infectious disease within a specific geographical region
(Hokajärvi, 2021). The technique of wastewater surveillance was initially developed as a means
of monitoring the use of illicit drugs by certain groups but was quickly modified to analyze
disease prevalence on a population level (Daughton, 2020). This allows it to serve as an early
detection system for infectious diseases by providing evidence of a virus before clinical evidence
is noticed by officials (CDC, 2021c). The value of such a methodology is tremendous. Individual
consent, for example, is not required for population-level testing. Moreover, everyone produces
human waste, so all persons located in a given geographical area will be involved in the testing
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pool. Although no sample collected will contain waste from the entire population, it will provide
an adequate representation of the prevalence of the disease or substance being tested (Gosnell,
2021).
While this methodology has many applications, this thesis will focus on the usage of
wastewater surveillance on university campuses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
SARS-CoV-2 virus is shed in human feces and can thus be detected in sewage, provided that
samples are collected and analyzed in a timely manner because of the rapid degradation of the
virus, particularly under warm, basic, and/or acidic conditions (Ahmed 2020b). Wastewater
surveillance is often used as a predictive factor for imminent outbreaks of disease, such as those
of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. It allows researchers to pinpoint specific regions of the broader testing
area that have the highest viral load of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Often, individuals are infectious
and shed the virus before exhibiting viral symptoms that indicate testing is needed.
Asymptomatic patients do not develop symptoms but are still capable of shedding the virus (Hill,
2020). Thus, wastewater surveillance is an effective tool that many universities have
implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic to track levels of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. These
data are used to effectively target testing and treatment efforts towards specific locations on
campuses (Horn, 2020). This paper investigates the relative successes of several universities’
approaches to wastewater surveillance and proposes the best methodology for future disease
outbreaks.
Wastewater Surveillance for Poliovirus
Wastewater surveillance has been used to detect infectious diseases prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As described by the CDC, poliomyelitis “is a disabling and
life-threatening disease caused by the poliovirus,” known for causing paralysis (CDC, 2021e).
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Polioviruses are a type of enteroviruses, small and non-enveloped RNA viruses of the genus
Enterovirus, family Picornaviridae. They can spread via oral or aerosol routes and often
clinically present as asymptomatic infections. This class of virus is shed in stool, meaning
poliovirus can be detected in wastewater, either as the result of an active infection or from an
individual vaccinated with a live poliovirus vaccine. Characteristically, enteroviruses have
moderate resistance to temperature and pH, allowing them to remain infectious and detectable in
wastewater for an extended period of time (Ivanova, 2019; Gosnell, 2021).
Russia was one of the first nations to realize the scientific value of the poliovirus’s
presence and longevity in human fecal matter. Starting in the middle of the 20th century, they
began to test wastewater to determine the effectiveness of their existing wastewater treatment
system and to monitor enteroviruses. Russia’s National Poliomyelitis Eradication Program was
implemented in 1996 to monitor poliovirus via wastewater surveillance. Russia also started a
national program, “Epidemiological surveillance and prophylaxis of non-polio enterovirus
infection,” to detect and monitor the presence of non-polio enteroviruses. Both programs utilize
the recommendations from the World Health Organization to correctly identify the viruses.
(Ivanova, 2019; Gosnell, 2021).
Russia is not the only nation to utilize wastewater surveillance to monitor poliovirus.
Israel has had a similar sewage surveillance system since 1989. It involves weekly collection and
analysis of sewage from the sewer system and wastewater treatment plants. In 2013, researchers
used it to detect poliovirus, prompting the government to spring into action and vaccinate their
citizens. This may have prevented the occurrence of a severe polio outbreak. Furthermore,
researchers were able to isolate the virus and examine its molecular characteristics. They were
able to learn that “the virus originated in Pakistan, then traveled into the region, diverging into
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Egypt, Israel, and Syria (Eisenberg, 2018).” Researchers at the University of Michigan’s School
of Public Health claim that “as the world approaches the final stages of polio eradication,
environmental surveillance becomes key. Looking for poliovirus in sewage is more sensitive
than counting up cases of [accute flaccid paralysis],” a condition caused by poliovirus and used
to monitor its transmission (Eisenberg, 2018). Additionally, wastewater surveillance can “detect
virus shed in the feces of non-paralyzed people infected with polio- … the silent circulation of
polio” ( Eisenberg, 2018). The same research team argued that the scope of wastewater
surveillance should be extended beyond poliovirus and used to detect other pathogens that are
shed into wastewater (Eisenberg, 2018; Gosnell, 2021).
India has also had great success with wastewater surveillance as a protective public
health measure. According to an article published by the Thomas Reuters Foundation, their
wastewater-based epidemiology served as an early warning system by detecting a strain of the
poliovirus in the city of Hyderabad in 2016. They had been “declared polio free by the World
Health Organization in March 2014 after an almost two-decade long, multi-million dollar effort
-- lauded as one of the country’s biggest public health achievements in recent times” (Bhalla,
2016). Being deemed “free” of a virus does not mean that an infectious disease cannot reemerge,
though, as indicated by the detection of polio in India’s wastewater. Thus, wastewater
surveillance can serve as a maintenance tool of sorts. In this case, its use allowed vaccination
efforts to be targeted at Hyderabad and Rangareddy, the areas that were deemed high risk for
transmission of the virus (Bhalla, 2016). The remainder of this paper will shift its focus from
poliovirus and move to the use of wastewater surveillance to monitor a now-infamous virus,
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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Overview of COVID-19
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a single-stranded
RNA viral agent that causes COVID-19. Coronaviruses are identifiable as enveloped,
positive-strand, RNA viruses that are capable of infecting vertebrates. SARS-CoV-2 belongs to
the subgenus Sarbecovirus of the family Coronaviridae (Coronaviridae, 2020). Symptoms of
COVID-19, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), include fever,
chills, shortness of breath, cough, difficulty breathing, fatigue, muscle and body aches, headache,
the new loss of taste and smell, sore throat, congestion, runny nose, nausea, vomiting, and
diarrhea. Individuals who are elderly or have underlying medical conditions, such as heart
disease, lung disease, and diabetes, are at a higher risk of developing a severe case of
COVID-19. This often manifests as breathing difficulties, with the most critical cases resulting in
respiratory and organ failure, organ dysfunction, septic shock, and/or death (CDC, 2021a;
Gosnell, 2021).
The CDC also states that the “estimated incubation period is between 2 and 14 days with
a median of 5 days. It is important to note that some people become infected and do not develop
any symptoms or feel unwell”(CDC, 2021a) The presence of asymptomatic cases during the
COVID-19 pandemic highlights the need for wastewater surveillance. Although there are some
exceptions, many people only feel the need to get tested for COVID-19 if they are having
symptoms. Thus, wastewater surveillance may capture cases of COVID-19 that would not have
been otherwise caught, providing a more holistic image of viral load in a population than clinical
testing alone. Humans shed SARS-CoV-2 in feces, making it an ideal candidate for wastewater
surveillance (CDC, 2021c; Gosnell, 2021).

9

Methods for Wastewater Surveillance of COVID-19
The specifics of the methodology of wastewater collection, processing, and analysis
depend on the exact purpose of the study. The CDC has released a testing methods overview in
which recommendations are made for the surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater. They are
summarized below (CDC, 2021b; Gosnell, 2021).
I.

Wastewater samples are collected.
A. Samples may come from a wastewater treatment plant for a homogenous
representation of a sewershed, wastewater coming from a specific geographical
area that feeds into a certain wastewater treatment plant.
B. Samples may come from a point source, such as a sewer that contains wastewater
coming from a single, specific building (CDC, 2021b; CDC, 2021c).

II.

Wastewater samples are processed, ideally within 24 hours of collection to minimize
degradation of SARS-CoV-2.
A. Sample preparation
1. Samples are stored at 4℃ if processing occurs within 24 hours of
collection. Samples that cannot be processed within this time frame should
be spiked with a matrix recovery control and refrigerated at 4℃ or frozen
at -20℃ or -70℃.
2. Samples are mechanically mixed to homogenize liquid and solid
components. Homogenization may include inversion, sonication, or other
mechanical methods.
3. Samples are clarified by large pore size filters or centrifugation to remove
large solids (CDC, 2021b).
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B. Sample Concentration
1. Ultrafiltration, ultracentrifugation, polyethylene glycol precipitation,
filtration through an electronegative membrane after pre-treatment with
MgCl2 or acidification, and skim milk flocculation are all methods that
can be used to concentrate SARS-CoV-2.
2. One of the options above should be selected via the following criteria
a) Sample type: Untreated samples can be concentrated through
several options, but primary sludge should be concentrated via
centrifugation.
b) Sample volume: Large untreated volumes may need to be divided
into smaller volumes before filtration, and volumes greater than 5L
may need to be pre-concentrated via large cartridge ultrafiltration
or a similar means.
c) Potential supply chain issues: Membrane filters, ultrafiltration
cartridges, and other commercial filtration products may not
always be readily available.
d) Sample processing time: Membrane filtration can be a lengthy
process. Lab personnel must have the facilities and availability if
this is a possibility.
e) Availability of laboratory equipment: Centrifuge volumes, force
capacity of centrifuges, and membrane filtration unit availability
should be considered (CDC, 2021b).
C. RNA extraction
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1. Nucleic acids are extracted and purified. Extraction protocols can vary but
should be specific for RNA, produce high purified nucleic acid extracts,
and use RNase denaturants before lysis steps. Extracts should be placed
into separate tubes and stored at -70℃ to prevent degradation during
multiple freeze-thaw cycles (CDC, 2021b).
D. RNA measurement methods (CDC, 2021b)
1. SARS-CoV-2 RNA quantification can be performed via reverse
transcription-quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR) or by
reverse transcription- droplet digital polymerase chain reaction
(RT-ddPCR). One-step and two-step reactions are suitable for both forms
of PCR.
2. SARS-COV-2 N (N1 and N2) are good targets for primers and probes
(CDC, 2021b).
The data collected via the methods above can be analyzed in many ways at the
researcher’s discretion. It is commonplace to utilize laboratory controls to ensure that the data
collected is accurate. Matrix recovery control, human fecal normalization, quantitative measure
controls, inhibition assessment, and negative controls are all recommended by the CDC to allow
for reliable comparison between the concentration of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater samples.
(CDC, 2021b; Gosnell, 2021).
Wastewater surveillance is not a form of research that only entails a laboratory. Rather, it
relies on support from a variety of external, community sources. Epidemiologists and
environmental health specialists are needed to obtain and analyze the data, but access to
wastewater treatment plants and/or sewer systems is crucial to sample collection (CDC, 2021c).
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It is crucial for researchers to have the support and understanding of their community. Adequate
research cannot be performed without the help of individuals whose work involves wastewater
treatment, sewershed maintenance, and/or plumbing (Gosnell, 2021).
Drawbacks of Using Wastewater Surveillance during the COVID-19 Global Pandemic
Wastewater surveillance, as discussed above, can serve as a remarkable public health
tool. However, it has its downfalls. The data collected from sewage testing is indicative of a
population’s general viral load, but a means of accurately using this data to determine the number
of cases of COVID-19 within the said population has not yet been developed (CDC, 2021c).
Some wastewater treatment plants use measures, such as pre-treatment of sewage, that prevent
accurate data from being obtained. Furthermore, certain outliers cannot be captured with
wastewater surveillance. This includes prisons, universities, and hospitals that treat their own
waste on-site. Houses with septic tanks/ systems also fall into this category. As with any form of
research, it is not possible for researchers to be 100% valid and accurate. Testing methods may
not be sophisticated enough to detect low levels of SARS-CoV-2, and this limit of detection is
still not entirely understood (CDC, 2021c; Gosnell, 2021).
Targeted wastewater surveillance is a means of obtaining wastewater samples that are
upstream from the wastewater treatment plant. While more specific than testing from an entire
sewershed, targeted wastewater surveillance also has disadvantages. Some desired locations may
not be possible to use as a testing site, depending on the infrastructure of the sewer lines
themselves (CDC, 2021c). Researchers must pay careful attention to all of these factors and
create their experimental design accordingly (Gosnell, 2021).
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Implementation of the National Wastewater Surveillance System
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are currently developing the National
Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) to track data obtained from wastewater surveillance at
state, tribal, local, and territorial levels (CDC, 2021c). This will create a cohesive database that
can be used for future applications of wastewater surveillance. Many colleges and universities
already have online dashboards that document data regarding the COVID-19 pandemic ( See:
“Wastewater Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 on College and University Campuses” section). The
NWSS aims to do something similar on a national scale by compiling and publishing wastewater
surveillance data (CDC, 2021c). The flowchart below depicts the exchange stream of information
regarding COVID-19 infections. (Gosnell, 2021).

Figure 1
NWSS Flow Chart (CDC, 2021d)
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The value of the NWSS is that communities will be able to compare their own response
to the COVID-19 pandemic with the responses of other communities. These responses, with the
right analytics, can be compared with case numbers and viral load in the wastewater and used to
determine which measures taken were effective. Already, many locations across the nation have
adopted wastewater surveillance to monitor the viral load of SARS-CoV-2. Although we may be
able to end the COVID-19 pandemic, it does not mean that SARS-CoV-2 will be eradicated at
the same time. Once established, the NWSS can be used to continue to monitor SARS-CoV-2 in
the case of future outbreaks without the need to restart wastewater surveillance with each new
outbreak of COVID-19. It is expected that there will be concerns about “privacy, stigma, and
potential negative repercussions of sharing these data,” for some have already expressed
apprehension about the publication of data from wastewater sampling at the college and
university level (CDC, 2021d). However, “the community-wide, non-individualized nature of the
technology mitigates [any] potential legal and ethical issues” by ensuring anonymity (CDC,
2021d). Thus, objections to the NWSS in the realm of ethical and privacy concerns will likely be
quickly refuted by reassurances that wastewater surveillance cannot link an infection to any one
individual (Gosnell, 2021).
Wastewater Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 on College and University Campuses
There has been a particularly notable usage of wastewater surveillance during the
COVID-19 pandemic, monitoring levels of SARS-CoV-2 on college and university campuses
(Harris-Lovett, 2021). Many schools began wastewater sampling efforts in the fall semester of
2020. Some had classes in person, some had virtual classes, and some had a hybrid of both, but
most colleges and universities had some population of students living on campus. The University
of Arizona (UArizona) became one of the most prominent schools in the media after
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“announcing that it had detected genetic material from SARS-CoV-2 in the wastewater from a
student dormitory” (Harris-Lovett, 2021). Wastewater surveillance quickly became a promising
public health tool to keep colleges and universities safe by serving as a predictive measure for
SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. By January 2021, over “210 colleges around the world had begun
monitoring wastewater for SARS-CoV-2,” providing a large influx of data to be analyzed
regarding the effectiveness of wastewater surveillance in the fight against the COVID-19
pandemic. (Harris-Lovett, 2021; Gosnell, 2021).
Many colleges and universities have published public, online dashboards to document
levels of SARS-CoV-2 on campus as the semester progresses. The University of South Carolina
Columbia (UofSC) is one such school as demonstrated in Figure 2. Their dashboard displays the
following data: number of current active cases, number of clinical tests performed, number of
positive tests, and vaccination rates. These numbers are also displayed as a cumulative case
tracker. The university then assesses the following campus alert factors: campus testing, contact
tracing, isolation and quarantine, environmental monitoring, campus case burden, campus health
care capacity, community health care capacity, mitigation compliance, campus impact on
operations, and community impact on operations. These factors are combined to synthesize the
overall alert level, a scale that ranges from new normal (0) to high (3), with low (1) and moderate
(2) as the levels in the middle (University of South Carolina, 2021; Gosnell, 2021).
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Figure 2
UofSC Columbia COVID-19 Dashboard as of March 27th, 2022 (University of South Carolina,
2021).

As discussed above, wastewater surveillance (described as environmental monitoring by
UofSC) is only one aspect of a campus’s efforts to contain and monitor SARS-CoV-2. This is
important to note, not to discount the value of wastewater surveillance, but rather to understand
the complexity of the public health response of which it is only a part. Wastewater surveillance
programs on college and university campuses have been most often initiated by engineering
departments, but biology, math, environmental health, and epidemiology departments have also
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been the catalyst for the implementation of these programs. Once this was undertaken, many
schools assembled multidisciplinary teams to accomplish their research, with “faculty, facilities
staff, and student health professionals [collaborating] to sustain the effort”(Harris-Lovett, 2021).
In addition to recognizing the diversity within the research teams, there is a wide range of
beneficiaries of this research effort. These include the entire research team, college
administrators, students, the local public health department, and members of the local
community (Harris-Lovett, 2021; Gosnell, 2021).
It must be recognized that the local community plays a role in both the response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and in data collection. Colleges and universities tend to have a constantly
changing population of students, faculty, and the general public. There is also the movement of
campus visitors within buildings open to the public, such as visitor’s centers and libraries. Thus,
depending on the locations colleges and universities choose as their testing sites, surveillance
may reveal SARS-CoV-2 that was not shed by members of the school. This could skew the
results of sample collection and the consequential public health response to the data. Many
students utilize on-campus academic buildings and resources but live off-campus. There are also
some students who will choose to get tested at off-campus doctor’s offices and pharmacies out of
convenience or appointment availability. The data collected by wastewater surveillance and
on-campus clinical testing may then not be representative of the entire student body.
Additionally, anyone who does not live on campus, whether a student or not, may abide by mask
mandates and social distancing requirements while on-campus but not in the rest of their daily
routine. This may undermine the apparent effectiveness of COVID-19 containment efforts on
campus. The lack of research in these areas offers an opportunity for retrospective studies that
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investigate external factors that may influence the validity and reliability of wastewater
surveillance on college and university campuses (Gosnell, 2021).
University-Specific Data and Responses
University of Arizona
As mentioned above, UArizona was a frontrunner in the effort to implement wastewater
surveillance on campuses. They began their efforts in the summer of 2020 and published a paper
on the topic in July 2021. It is important to note that with UArizona beginning sampling so early
into the pandemic, its wastewater surveillance technology was not as readily acquired. Its
research team’s first set of published data was thus collected via grab samples. This method uses
a “pole/dipper” technique to obtain samples from the sewer system at a specific location and
time (Betancourt, 2021). UofSC also utilized grab samples in the beginning stages of their
surveillance but switched over to autosamplers as soon as they were available. The rationale
behind this switch in methodology was to reduce the margin for human error and to increase the
validity and reliability of testing by using composite samples. Unlike grab samples, composite
samples represent the population at multiple points in time. Autosamplers function by using a
hose to draw up a programmed volume of sewage on a fixed schedule. For example, UofSC
programmed their autosamplers to collect 30mL of sewage every 15 minutes over 24 hours,
giving each sample 96 data points. This increases the likelihood that fecal matter from infected
individuals will be captured. Homogenization of samples allows for a uniform and random
blending of all 96 data points (Sellers, 2022).
Despite not having access to autosamplers, UArizona modeled initial grab sample
methodology to resemble that of composite sampling. The researchers described their sampling
schedule as follows:
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Samples were collected at 8:00 am on August 18 and 20 during the week that students
moved into the dorm. Daily samples were collected from August 25–31 to monitor
SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater during the first week of classes. On August 26, five
samples were collected five minutes apart between 8:30–8:50 am when peak flow
occurred indicating maximum restroom usage to determine sample variation during
sample collection. On August 27, two more samples were collected from Dorm A, one in
the morning (9:30 am) and afternoon (1:15 pm) to ensure the presence or absence of the
virus at different times of the day (Betancourt, 2021).
The data collected on August 26th mirrors that of a composite sampling, for sewage was
collected multiple times from one location. However, it does not seem that the samples were
compiled into one sample. Rather, they were individually tested in order to determine the degree
to which variation occurred. This functioned as a control measure of sorts, with the researchers
able to analyze how reliable their results were. The concentration of N2 (copies/L) remained
constant between all samples taken on August 26th, but the concentration of N1 (copies/L)
demonstrated fluctuation. N1 and N2 are genes found in SARS-CoV-2 and are commonly used
as targets for testing. The researchers briefly commented on these findings, stating that it was
believed that these “variations in the efficiency of the methods are predominantly associated with
the complexity of this environmental matrix” (Betancourt, 2021). The team also performed a
recovery analysis, with matrix spikes demonstrating “an average recovery of 14 ± 16% which
indicated low and highly variable efficiencies of recovery of HCoV 229 E in wastewater as
observed in studies with other coronaviruses used for the same purpose” (Betancourt, 2021)
They attributed the low efficiency of recovery to the environmental matrix as well (Betancourt,
2021). This information, when simplified, indicates that the data collected at UArizona was not
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always consistent, and researchers believed it was a result of the complexity of the sewershed,
building infrastructure, and other variations that may have made it difficult to standardize
sampling.
University of North Carolina Charlotte
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNCC) implemented wastewater
surveillance in the Fall of 2020 as well. Their research team “was able to detect single
asymptomatic individuals in dorms with resident populations of 150-200” through the utilization
of wastewater surveillance on a thrice-weekly schedule (Gibas, 2021). The university’s overall
approach was described as “four-pronged” and used “symptomatic testing, daily health checks,
and in-hour contact tracing” in addition to wastewater testing (Gibas, 2021). They identified six
areas in which they had to decide which methodology would yield the best results: “1) where to
sample, 2) how often to sample, 3) what kind of sample to collect, 4) what type of sample
concentration protocol to use, 5) what kind of RNA extraction protocol to use, and 6) what type
of detection method to use”(Gibas, 2021). These considerations are crucial, for they can
influence the quality of data collected. It is important to note that their article stresses the short
time frame of eight weeks that the research team had to make these decisions, on top of limited
equipment and protocols available. The figure below shows the sampling, collection, processing,
and reporting schedule that UNCC’s team used (Gibas, 2021).
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Figure 3
UNCC’s weekly wastewater surveillance schedule (Gibas, 2021).

UNCC used an electronegative filtration process, HA, as opposed to physical filtration
(Gibas, 2021). Dr. Cynthia Gibas, a professor for the Department of Bioinformatics and
Genomics and a member of UNCC’s COVID-19 wastewater surveillance team, explained the
rationale for this choice of methodology by stating, “Our collaborator Mariya Munir was already
using HA filtration as part of the statewide NC wastewater monitoring effort so it was easy to get
up and running. Later we switched to InnovaPrep Cp Select concentrators because they are
faster” (Gibas, C., personal communication, March 27, 2022). Efficiency was a driving factor for
UNCC’s testing protocol. By the spring semester of 2021, they were processing their samples on
the same day that they collected them, yielding same-day results (Gibas, 2021). According to Dr.
Gibas, UNCC “tried using ddPCR instead of qPCR, but the ddPCR runs take too long for the
reporting schedule [they] are on” (Gibas, C., personal communication, March 27, 2022). Unique
to UArizona and UofSC, UNCC implemented surge clinical testing at dormitories that had a
positive signal for SARS-CoV-2 that could not be explained by a recently identified and
quarantined positive case or otherwise accounted for. They used clinical testing as a means of
finding the source of the positive signal to rapidly isolate the infected individual(s). Thus, they
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needed to ensure wastewater samples were processed and analyzed as quickly as possible to
prevent the further spread of the virus. The figure below displays the “total number of
SARS-CoV-2 positive wastewater samples from UNCC dormitories (red, right axis) and daily
new positive cases in Mecklenburg county (blue, left axis) from September 28 to November 23,
2020” (Gibas, 2021).

Figure 4
Comparison between the wastewater signals from UNCC and clinically-proven cases in
Mecklenburg, the county in which UNCC is located (Gibas, 2021).
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University of South Carolina
In the Fall of 2020, UofSC began wastewater surveillance in an effort to mitigate the
effects of COVID-19 on a university that had not switched to fully-online instruction. The first
month was filled with trial and error, as no one at the university had performed wastewater
sample collection prior to the pandemic. UofSC, as mentioned above, was able to switch over to
ISCO autosamplers later in the Fall of 2020. Information, collected before the samplers were
obtained, was still reported to the university but will not be discussed in this paper for the sake of
both consistency and accuracy. Figure 5 displays the gradual transition researchers made
between grab and composite samples. By September 27th, all samples were being collected via
autosamplers. The team modified locations throughout the semester as they found certain sewer
access points easier to deploy an autosampler in than others. Figure 6 shows the finalized list of
locations that were tested throughout the course of the Fall 2020 semester, and Figure 7 shows
the data collected from these sites (Sellers, 2022).
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Figure 5
The transition between grab samples and composite samples in the Fall 2020 semester (Sellers,
2022).

Note. The colors of the squares represent the following types of samples: pink, grab; orange; one
day of grab and one day of composite; red, composite.

Figure 6
UofSC Fall 2020 semester on-campus sampling locations (Sellers, 2022).
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Figure 7
The relative concentration of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater (Sellers, 2022).

The protocol used by UofSC was as follows: samples were collected twice weekly, with
autosamplers deployed on Mondays and Thursdays. The composite samples were collected on
Tuesdays and Fridays and promptly processed. Homogenization was accomplished by blending
each sample for ten minutes. The samples were then physically filtered to a volume of 400 µL
via Amicon Ultrafilters. 200 µL of each sample was stored at -80℃ while the other 200 µL was
used for RNA extractions. The viral load in each sample was quantified using RT-qPCR until the
end of December 2020. These data were then relayed to university personnel to determine which
areas on campus would most benefit from targeted pop-up testing sites (Sellers, 2020).

26

At the start of the Spring 2021 semester, the team gained access to Droplet Digital PCR
(ddPCR) technology and implemented it into their protocol instead of RT-qPCR. A 2017 study
“conclude[d] that for sample/target combinations with low levels of nucleic acids (Cq ≥ 29)
and/or variable amounts of chemical and protein contaminants, ddPCR technology will produce
more precise, reproducible and statistically significant results required for publication-quality
data” in comparison to qPCR (Taylor, 2017). Thus, the team felt that ddPCR would provide more
reliable and accurate results (Sellers, 2022).
Unlike UNCC, UofSC was not able to implement surge testing of specific dormitories.
University ethical and legal concerns led to this decision, for not every dormitory was feasible as
a testing location. Students living in non-testable dormitories would have consequently been
placed at a disadvantage if they did not receive the same access to surge testing. The university
did implement pop-up testing sites, though. After receiving data from the research team, UofSC
placed clinical testing locations on areas of campus that had high signals for SARS-CoV-2
(Sellers, 2022).
Challenges
Supply Chain Issues
One difficulty experienced by the scientific community during COVID-19 did not
concern the science itself. Instead, it involved widespread supply chain issues. The American
Society for Microbiology noted that both diagnostic and non-diagnostic testing were affected.
According to them, pandemic shortages included, but were not limited to, “culture and transport
media, swabs, pipettes, pipette tips, and collection tubes” (Hagen, 2020). The research team at
UofSC experienced this first-hand with autosamplers. At the start of the Fall 2020 semester,
ISCO autosamplers were ordered with the intention of collecting composite samples starting in
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September. However, due to problems with the supply chain, the team did not receive their
autosamplers until the end September of 2020. UofSC researchers also experienced a similar
issue with tubing for autosamplers at the start of the Spring 2021 semester. When they were
unable to obtain it directly from the autosampler company, they bypassed the supply chain by
purchasing tubing of the same material and diameter from a local hardware store. Additionally,
the author and other members of the research team performing wastewater surveillance on
UofSC’s campus had difficulty obtaining the following supplies during the peak of the
pandemic:
● Amicon Ultrafilters
● 200 µL pipette tips
● gloves
● bleach
● KN95 and N95 masks
● ddPCR Mastermix
●

N1 and N2 assays

● conical tubes (Sellers, S., personal communication, March 24, 2022).
Dr. Gibas identified the following supply shortages experienced by UNCC, some of which
overlap with those of UofSC’s.
● autosamplers
● pipette tips
● primers for targeted amplicon sequencing and other reagents (Gibas, C., personal
communication, March 27, 2022).
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Both universities experienced great difficulty with supply shortages at the beginning of testing in
the Fall 2020 semester. Gloves and bleach are often purchased in bulk from laboratory sources,
and while these items can also be found at hardware and grocery stores, supply-chain shortages
might also affect these alternative sources.
Burnout
Although unrelated to supply chains, there was another shortage that many research
teams experienced during their surveillance of COVID-19: a shortage of research personnel as
individuals became ill or infected. The research team at UofSC primarily consisted of three
undergraduate students in the semester of Fall 2020. As various members of this small group fell
ill and were quarantined, master's and post-doctorate students had to fill in to keep testing on a
regular schedule. This was a huge strain on the lab, for these graduates were already performing
sample processing of wastewater for the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control (Sellers, S., personal communication, March 24, 2022).
When asked if burnout was also experienced by UNCC’s research team, Dr. Gibas
replied:
Oh yes. The 3x/week schedule is tough on everyone. We have gone through four different
field collection people since that is the most physically demanding job, and we've had
about a dozen different part timers during the project, but partly that's just because
students graduate in the natural course of things. We've had five PhD students involved in
different aspects of method optimization, 12 Masters students, and 13 undergraduates
involved in lab work (some as volunteers and some paid). Plus three full time lab
personnel. We had to have a lot of redundancy because even when we were being
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maximally careful people would be out with COVID from time to time (Gibas, C.,
personal communication, March 27, 2022).
Dr. Gibas touched on the unique challenge that COVID-19 brought to research labs- the
possibility of laboratory staff becoming isolated or quarantined when infected or exposed to the
SARS-CoV-2 virus.
UofSC experienced this very issue. With only three undergraduate students, one lab
director, and two members of maintenance tasked with sample collection and processing,
COVID-19 had a great impact on the availability of staff. Sarah Sellers, one of the
undergraduates, remembers a time when both of the other undergraduates were sick with
COVID-19 one after the other. She explained, “that was especially difficult because we were still
new to the process so it wasn’t quite as easy…. I think a big issue that anyone working with
COVID would say is that there’s a lot of burnout when you experience all of these shortages and
then are still expected to keep going…” (Sellers, S., personal communication, March 24, 2022).
The very nature of a pandemic lends itself to burnout. There is no freedom to take a break from
wastewater surveillance, for the health of students, faculty, and staff depends on it. Increasing the
number of research staff may help to mitigate the problem of burnout by having a rotation of
team members that can take turns collecting and processing samples. Each member should also
be trained in all steps of the process so that they can readily step in if a coworker falls ill.
Increasing the number of researchers and knowledge of each employee will initially be
time-consuming and costly but will pay off in the long run in terms of the mental health and
stamina of employees.
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Results Comparison
It is difficult to concretely say one university’s methodology was better than the others. It
is, however, feasible to analyze which approaches are most appropriate for university-level
sampling based on testing schedules, building locations, and the implementation of control
measures. These factors are discussed in the following section. This paper initially aimed to look
at published data concerning the correlation between positive detections of SARS-CoV-2 and
positive clinical testing. However, there is a severe shortage of such data in published literature.
Dr. Gibas provided the following information regarding the correlational analysis of
UNCC’s data: “we've got all sorts of data that we're working on publishing -- everything from
clinical sequencing that matches up with cases on specific dates in buildings to overall building
population and case count data. We did an IRB with the university that allowed us to access
aggregated case, contact tracing, symptom reporting, and vaccination data from the university's
COVID registry and we are working on analyzing that now” (Gibas, C., personal
communication, March 27, 2022). UofSC is in the midst of using a biostatistical approach to
provide adjusted, correlational data between positive cases on campus and positive wastewater
signals. The author could not obtain a statement from researchers at UArizona but speculates that
their data is also similarly being analyzed. Therefore, further comparison and analysis between
these three universities should be conducted after all of these data are available. This may further
support claims in this paper regarding appropriate methodologies.
Future Directions
One keyword comes to mind when considering America’s initial reaction to the
COVID-19 pandemic: unprepared. It is extremely likely, almost certain, that we will experience
another pandemic of this magnitude in our lifetimes. Thus, we must take measures now to
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prepare our nation’s universities for an epidemic similar in magnitude to the COVID-19
pandemic. Although a supply chain shortage cannot be easily avoided, precautionary measures
can still be taken. Laboratories that anticipate performing wastewater surveillance during a future
pandemic should keep extra supplies on hand at all times, such as gloves, bleach, pipette tips,
autosamplers, and autosampler tubing. These are not perishable supplies, so long-term storage of
them should not be an issue. At the first sign of the rapid spreading of an emerging or reemerging
infectious disease, laboratories should order necessary perishable supplies, such as primers and
reagents so that they will be ready to start wastewater surveillance as soon as it is needed.
An established universal protocol should be readily available for the next pandemic, even
if it will require adjustment. Each institution can modify the protocol according to its testing and
materials availability. However, the following recommendations can be made after analyzing
UArizona’s, UNCC’s, and UofSC’s methodology and data and speaking with their staff. The
parentheticals contain the institution(s) that have already utilized that methodology.
● Bovine coronavirus can be used as a process control to see how effective testing is
(Sellers, 2022; Gibas, 2021).
● Data loggers are devices that can be placed in sample collection containers to track their
temperature throughout the collection period and initial processing. This will demonstrate
whether or not samples are maintained at the ideal temperature to minimize the risk of
viral degradation (Sellers, 2022).
● Perform Building Information Modeling (BIM) should be used when selecting testing
sites and determining whether to use an internal or external access point (Gibas, 2021).
● Autosamplers should be used to collect composite samples. Collection timing and volume
can be adjusted based on flow rate and volume at each school. However, composite

32

samples should be considered the gold standard in comparison to grab samples (Sellers,
2022; Gibas, 2021).
● Steel strainers should be placed on the end of autosampler tubing to prevent clogging and
maximize sample collection (Sellers, 2022; Gibas, 2021).
● A drafted list of items that can be purchased locally if backordered, such as tubing from
hardware stores (Sellers, 2022).
● Standardized usage of dd-PCR (Sellers, 2022).
● Cooperation of university administration to allow for surge testing (Gibas, 2021).
● Large numbers of laboratory staff to prevent burnout and maximize efficiency (Gibas,
2021).
In addition to the above methods, there are other measures that the nation should take to
prepare universities for the next pandemic. Funding should be secured and used to establish
equipment for wastewater surveillance for as many universities as possible. This includes all of
the non-perishable supplies discussed previously. Perishable supplies should not be purchased,
but funding should be set aside to be used for the purchase of such items when necessary. This
preemptive approach will benefit universities by taking away the initial struggle of finding the
money necessary for sample collection and processing. It is acceptable for each laboratory to
have a preference for a particular brand of extraction kits and other materials; however, staff
should have a list of suitable alternatives, should supply chain issues hinder the acquisition of
their typical choice of supplies.
The cornerstone of the scientific community is knowledge. This should never be
gatekept, particularly in the midst of a deadly pandemic when people’s lives are at stake. The
establishment of an online database for laboratory teams to share best methods could allow for
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the streamlining of wastewater surveillance on a national level to compile a collaborated,
national protocol for wastewater surveillance. This could be readily used by all universities and
allow for faster activation of response during a pandemic. Such a system would be particularly
useful for new employees or schools that have not performed wastewater surveillance before.
Limitations
This paper has explored three universities and the available data associated with their
COVID-19 responses. It is important to note that this thesis was limited by published material.
The author attempted to bypass this by contacting researchers at UofSC, UArizona and UNCC.
Researchers at UArizona could not be reached for further information. The author was privy to a
greater degree of information for UofSC, as she was a member of the school’s COVID-19
wastewater surveillance research team and a co-author of the team’s pending research paper.
Thus, some unconscious biases may have occurred while evaluating the research methodology of
the other two schools.
Conclusions
There is no way of knowing in what form or when the next epidemic will take place. The
COVID-19 pandemic has been filled with scientific trial and error as researchers have pushed
boundaries to protect our nation. Wastewater surveillance is a prime example of one of these
scientific endeavors, allowing universities to monitor the status of SARS-CoV-2 on campuses.
Correlational research needs to be published before a supported best methods list can be
compiled for multiple, specific settings. Although a conclusive statement cannot be yet made, it
is likely that wastewater surveillance has saved the health, if not lives, of many members of our
universities.
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